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MARY MIDGLEY, "BRUTALITY AND SENTIMENTALITY,"
PHILOSOPHY 54, (JULY, 1979), PP, 385-389.
Mary Midgley s aim in "Brutality and Senti
mentality" is to maintain that "the notion
that it is sentimental to attribute feelings
to animals is pretty confused, because it is
a charge against the motives of the attri
butors, not really against what they say."l
Not unlike the argument in her Beast and Man
(1978), Midgley's position here makes an --
epistemologically bold assumption: it is
just as plausible for one to say that he or
she can identify feelings in nonhuman animals
as it is to attempt the same feat with other
humans. If, as is generally accepted, one
has warrant for inferring from one's own
experience the feelings of other humans,
then a like inference about the feelings
of nonhuman animals also properly can be
made.
Unfortunately, Hidgley skirt!! some basic
issues; as a result, she does not make a
persuas~ve case.
It must be recognized that
a challenge to human-centered thinking is
an important issue in ph,ilosophy and theolo!F
today; but for one to v~ew the problem of 'bru
tality" and "sentimentality" as an ei"Jpirical
one is to blur the distinction which obtains
between activity and agency. Behavior can be
observed and, at least in some ways, it can
be measured empirically; but what would it
mean to say that a "personality trait" is
an empirical phenomenon capable of some kind
of measurement?2 tVhat kind of "evidence"
could be provided for a determination of the
nature of one's motives in acting either kindly
or cruelly toward any creature? How can one
determine whether and to what extent one
"distorts" reality either by refusing to adopt
a sympathetic attitude toward nonhuman creatures
or by projecting a "brutal" image onto them?
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Midgley's argument begs a f·mdamental ques
question: how does one know that different modes
of existence (e.g., a human and a wolf) have
experiences which are closely enough related
to warrant inferences of the sort Midgley
wishes to make? It is one thing to say that
"notions like fear, anger, pleasure, etc.,
were not invented in or for an exclusively
human world .... they grew up in a thoroughly
public world inhabited by many species ... "3;
it is quite a different thing to conflate
"notion" and "experience," and then to
conclude from the above assertion about the
publicity of fear, anger, and pleasure,
that "species solipsism is no more con
convincing than the personal kind."4 In order
to make a convin. Lng argument, Midgley must
show decisively tnat her pOpition does not
"distort" reality; but, given the way she
has decided to address this issue, it would
seem that such a task is in principle impos
impossible for her to realize. While Midgley's
intentions are without doubt laudable, her
approach to the. problem of human-nonhuman
relations cannot provide the results she
seeks. Much more work remains to be done.
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